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The Determinants of Changing 
Poverty and Whether Work 
Will Work 
Richard Dickens and David T. Ellwood 
Scholars in the United Kingdom emphasize that poverty in Great Britain 
has risen sharply since the late 1970s. According to Goodman, Johnson, 
and Webb (1997), after remaining steady at roughly 11 percent though the 
1960s and falling to 8 or 9 percent in the 1970s, it has since doubled. Mean- 
while, in the United States, both official figures and traditional poverty 
scholars report sharp declines in poverty. Since reaching 15 percent in the 
early 1980s, official poverty rates are now at 11 percent. The black poverty 
rate and the rate for single parents are at their lowest level in the forty years 
for which data are reported (U.S. Bureau of  the Census 2000). What ac- 
counts for the apparent divergence? More importantly, what factors-de- 
mographic, economic, or policy-account  for the changes in poverty in the 
two nations? And what role could policy play in reducing poverty? 
Of course, a major reason for the differences in reported poverty trends 
is that the nations remain divided by a common language with a very un- 
common set of definitions. In Britain and Europe, poverty is traditionally 
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measured according to a relative scale-families  are considered poor if 
their incomes fall below 60 percent of the (family-size-adjusted) median in- 
come. By  contrast, in the United States, poverty is measured against an 
absolute standard that is adjusted annually only for inflation. More subtle 
distinctions include the fact that in Britain poverty is typically based on 
weekly income net of taxes, while in the United States it is based on gross 
annual income. 
In this paper, we work to create common measures of poverty in the two 
nations. We develop a procedure that allows one to more fully trace out the 
relative impacts of altered  demographics,  rising wage  inequality,  work 
changes, and policy innovations in explaining changing poverty patterns 
than the usual aggregate models allow. And we use this procedure to de- 
termine the forces shaping poverty in the two nations. Our basic method- 
ological idea is straightforward, if rather difficult to implement. For mem- 
bers of the sample in any given year, we estimate what each person’s and 
family’s work, wages, and benefits would have been if the structure of pay, 
employment, or aid had been equivalent to that of a base year. We can then 
estimate what poverty would have been if one or all of the base-year con- 
ditions still prevailed. 
Using this method, we  find that the forces influencing poverty differ 
across nations and across absolute versus relative poverty measures. A 
number of important findings emerge from this paper: 
Britain and the United States share some broad patterns in common- 
relative poverty  has risen  in both nations, albeit much more so in 
Britain, and in recent years, absolute poverty has fallen in both. 
There are very sizable differences in the magnitudes and trends. By 
measures used here, the United States has considerably higher relative 
poverty. But very importantly, relative poverty in Britain has risen far 
more sharply over the past twenty years, and the gap between the 
countries has closed considerably. 
In both  nations  demographic change  and  rising  wage  inequality 
played key roles in increasing relative poverty, but the impacts were far 
greater in Britain. Yet for absolute poverty, wage changes had almost 
no net effect in Britain, while they had a modest effect in the United 
States. 
Britain has experienced a dramatic rise in workless households while 
the United States has simultaneously had a sharp fall. In Britain this 
had a sizable impact on relative and absolute poverty. In the United 
States, increasing work has had little impact on relative poverty but re- 
sulted in a sizable reduction of absolute poverty. 
Ignoring any behavioral impacts, expanding government benefits re- 
duced relative and absolute poverty considerably in Britain over this The Determinants of Changing Poverty and Whether Work Will Work  315 
period. By contrast, as compared to 1979, the impacts of U.S. benefits 
were almost negligible. 
Both the level and structure of government aid differ enormously 
across the two nations. Government benefits for workless households 
are higher and have grown in Britain. In the United States, govern- 
ment benefits for those with no earnings have been cut dramatically, 
while in recent years, benefits for those with low to moderate earnings 
have risen considerably. 
The changing patterns of benefits and work strongly suggest that, in 
the United States at least, policy changes have significantly influenced 
work behavior (particularly by single parents) and thus altered pov- 
erty. In Britain the policy changes may have had the reverse effect, re- 
ducing work among many groups, though the evidence is far from con- 
clusive. 
The relatively modest changes in incentives currently contemplated by 
U.K. policymakers will still leave Britain with a vastly different struc- 
ture of benefits than the United States. Based on the results of this pa- 
per, we suspect they will have a modest impact on work. Only a strat- 
egy that will dramatically increase work and significantly increase the 
incomes of lower-paid workers will have a really sizable impact on rel- 
ative poverty, and both of these will prove hard to achieve. Any purely 
work-based strategy, which doesn’t tackle demographics and wage dis- 
persion, may not have a dramatic effect on relative poverty. 
8.1  Measuring Poverty in Great Britain and the United States 
Our first goal is to create as common a set of poverty definitions across 
the two countries as possible. This involves recognizing different types of 
poverty standards, the definitions of income, and definitions of families. 
8.1.1 
Poverty is typically defined as a situation where family income falls be- 
low some standard that varies by family size. But the way the standard is 
determined differs by country. 
There is no official poverty standard in Britain, but there is something of 
a conventional wisdom. Poverty has traditionally been defined as having 
net household income after taxes below half the mean (with appropriate 
adjustments for family size). However, more recently a relative measure 
based upon 60 percent of median income has gained prominence and has 
been adopted as the official poverty standard by Eurostat.’ These relative 
Relative versus Absolute Poverty Standards 
1. Note also that the British government’s commitment to eradicate child poverty is based 
on a poverty definition of 60 percent of median household income. 316  Richard Dickens and David T. Ellwood 
measures are based on the assumption that poverty is best understood as 
depending on where a family stands in comparison to others. If the income 
of disadvantaged families rises slightly, but the average income of families 
overall rises a great deal, poverty will increase using this measure. 
The United States does have an official poverty standard and it is widely 
used. The government defines poverty using an absolute standard that has 
been essentially unchanged2 in real terms for thirty-five years. The absolute 
standard assumes that what matters is the absolute position of a family. If 
the income of disadvantaged families rises slightly, but the average income 
of families overall rises a great deal, poverty will decrease using this mea- 
sure. 
There is a large and energetic literature about the pros and cons of rela- 
tive and absolute measures. Both have their virtues. The notion that a near- 
poor family is no worse off if the standard of living of most other families 
rises considerably  seems implausible. What once were luxuries, such as 
telephones and indoor plumbing, become  necessities as the society be- 
comes more prosperous. A relative measure seems to come closer to cap- 
turing the larger notions of poverty, which might involve a sense of con- 
nection or inclusion in the overall society. 
At the same time, it seems odd to assume that low-income families would 
be worse off if their income rose 40 percent over a decade while the income 
of the average family rose by 50 percent. An absolute measure captures the 
notion that having more food or better housing can be a benefit even if oth- 
ers do as well or even better. 
Absolute standards pose another problem for international work-how 
should a common absolute standard be set? One possibility is to use a com- 
mon standard adjusted for the exchange rate and differences in purchasing 
power. Since the United States is somewhat wealthier by this standard than 
Britain, there will almost inevitably be more poverty in Britain. These is- 
sues do not arise with relative standards since each country is being mea- 
sured relative to its mean or median income. 
For purposes of this paper, we will examine both absolute and relative 
measures, though we will concentrate disproportionately on relative mea- 
sures since this volume is focused on the British economy. For relative 
poverty we use 60 percent of median income and use the family-size adjust- 
ment derived by McClements (1977), which is commonly used in Britain. 
For absolute poverty standards we use slightly different procedures in 
each country. In Britain, we set the absolute standard for poverty equal to 
60 percent of median income in 1979. Thus for 1979 in Britain, the mea- 
sures of absolute and relative poverty are the same. After 1979 the relative 
poverty line rises or falls with median income, but the absolute measure re- 
mains unchanged (except for inflation adjustments). 
2. There have been minor changes to definitions and family-size adjustments over the years. The Determinants of Changing Poverty and Whether Work Will Work  317 
We experimented with two different absolute poverty standards for the 
United States. One was to use the 60 percent of median 1979 income in the 
United States, just as  was done for Britain. This yields a 1999 poverty stan- 
dard of $32,652 for a family of four’--considerably  above the U.S. official 
standard of $17,356. More importantly, this procedure also yields an ab- 
solute poverty standard that is considerably higher in purchasing power 
parity terms for the United States than for Britain because U.S. average in- 
comes were higher in 1979. If the 1999 U.S.-U.K. purchasing power parity 
were applied to the 60 percent median 1979 income standard for Britain, 
the poverty line in the United States would instead have been $20,047- 
much closer to the official U.S.  poverty line. Given the likely interest of U.S. 
readers in the official poverty line, we report in the body of the text absolute 
figures for the United States using the official US.  standards. We have done 
all calculations using both standards. The trends for the 60 percent median 
1979 U.S. income standard are virtually identical; and later in the paper, 
figure 8.7, which uses the official poverty line, is reproduced using the 60 
percent median 1979 standard in Dickens and Ellwood (2001, fig. Al). 
8.1.2 
Poverty is generally measured using large cross-sectional surveys in each 
country, but there are important differences in what the surveys measure. 
Successive  waves of the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), based on inter- 
views from roughly 10,000 households annually, are typically used to de- 
termine poverty levels. Income is a weekly measure. When poverty is mea- 
sured, researchers generally count as income earnings, dividends, interest, 
rent, pensions, and government aid, including nearly all social security be- 
nefits and housing4  Taxes are deducted from income to give a sense of dis- 
posable income. Often the income is calculated both before and after hous- 
ing costs to control for unmeasured Imputed incomes of owner-occupiers 
and because housing costs often vary greatly by region. 
The issue of housing is further complicated in Britain by the provision of 
social housing. In 1980 about 33 percent of tenants were living in govern- 
ment-provided housing with subsidized rents. A large proportion of the so- 
cial housing stock was sold off to tenants through the “right to buy” pol- 
icy of the Thatcher government. Furthermore, rents were deregulated and 
from 1983 housing aid was provided through Housing Benefit, which cov- 
ers housing costs for eligible claimants. As rents increased, so did housing 
benefits. This resulted in a shift in housing aid from subsidized rents to 
Definition of Income and Family/Household Unit 
3. The poverty standard varies somewhat by the relationships of the four family members. 
This figure is the weighted average for all families with exactly four members. 
4. In Britain, virtually all nonhousing aid is called social security benefits. To avoid confu- 
sion with the very different U.S. Social Security system, which is primarily for the aged and 
disabled, we will generally refer to  British social security  benefits as “government aid” broadly 
to include these benefits along with housing. 318  Richard Dickens and David T. Ellwood 
cash support through benefit payments. The FES does collect information 
on cash support from Housing Benefits, and it reports whether  people 
resided in social housing, but it has no estimate of the value of the subsi- 
dies to these residents. If one counts the value of the cash Housing Benefit 
but ignores the value of these social housing subsidies, one would show a 
sizable increase in housing aid that is partly the result of moving such aid 
from the uncounted social housing subsidy to the counted Housing Ben- 
efit. Because these subsidies are administered and funded at local author- 
ity level rather than household level, there is no reliable information with 
which to determine the exact subsidies that different families received over 
time. One can, however, get a measure of the aggregate subsidy from local 
authority housing revenue accounts. And the FES does include a mea- 
sure of the rent actually paid by housing tenants. After some experimen- 
tation, we  imputed housing subsidy by  applying the national percentage 
subsidy (expressed as a percentage of rent) to the rents reported by fami- 
lies and individuals in social housing. 
In official U.S. statistics, the March supplement of the Current Popula- 
tion Survey (CPS) is used. The March CPS collects information about in- 
come and work over the previous year from respondents in 40,000-50,000 
households each year. For measuring poverty, income is based on gross an- 
nual income including earnings, rent, dividends, and interest, plus cash be- 
nefits from the government. Taxes are  not deducted, and so-called “in-kind 
benefits” are left out. This excludes some very important sources of gov- 
ernment aid such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (“taxes”) and food 
stamps and housing aid (in-kind benefits). Numerous scholars, including a 
recent panel of the National Academy of Sciences, have called for revising 
this standard (Citro and Michael 1995) by ensuring that income is adjusted 
for taxes and most in-kind aid5  and work expenses. 
We use the FES and CPS data for this study. We have no choice but to 
use weekly income in the FES and annual income in the CPS. Since weekly 
income  is  more volatile  than annual income,  we  would  expect  British 
poverty would be lower if it were based on an annual measure.6  In the U.S. 
data, we  add the value of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), food 
stamps, and housing benefits to other income for purposes of determining 
poverty. This correction should provide a more accurate picture of U.S. 
gross income. 
We cannot create after-housing poverty measures for the United States 
because information on housing expenditures is not collected in the CPS. 
5. The question of whether medical benefits should be included in income remains contro- 
versial. 
6.  Boheim and Jenkins (2000) show that income analysis based upon current monthly and 
annual incomes provides remarkably similar results, although there is some question over re- 
liability of the annual income measure which is largely imputed from monthly data. The Determinants of Changing Poverty and Whether Work Will Work  319 
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Alternative measures of relative poverty in Britain, households headed by 
Gross versus net income poses a different problem. Our methodology calls 
for estimating what each person and family would earn under different 
conditions in different years. As their income changes so too would their 
taxes owed. The structure of taxes is sufficiently complex, especially in the 
United States, that it is far beyond the scope of this paper to estimate the 
new taxes for families under a variety of changed conditions.’ 
Figure 8.1 illustrates for Britain what difference the definition makes. It 
tracks relative poverty in Britain using gross and net income, with and 
without housing. Although the measures differ in their levels, they track 
each other almost perfectly over time. To facilitate comparisons and cal- 
culations, we will use poverty based on gross income before housing. It is 
intriguing that this measure is very close to one based on net income after 
housing. In the 1980s, gross income before housing poverty is between 1.5 
and 2.0 percentage points higher. This difference narrows somewhat in the 
1990s. Since our goal is to  understand the key trends, we are convinced that 
our measure will perform quite well. 
7. In Britain, we have more hope. We have access to the Institute for Fiscal Studies Taxben 
model, which can calculate taxes and transfers for any family under any conditions. In later 
versions, we may use this model to estimate net income for Britain. We have no such model 
for the United States. Though such models do exist for the United States, of course, they are 
often quite massive and would be quite difficult to implement here. 320  Richard Dickens and David T.  Ellwood 
Households, Families, and Filing Units 
Unfortunately, the definitions of families and households differ slightly 
between countries as well. In Britain, the economic unit is based on defini- 
tions comparable to benefit units for purposes of determining social secu- 
rity. This comes close to a household definition of an income unit. In par- 
ticular,  cohabiting couplcs are treated equivalently  to married  couples. 
Incomes are measured at the household level since this is how some be- 
nefits are determined. The United States is based on families-defined  as 
persons who are related by birth or marriage who are living together in the 
same household. Unrelated adults in the same household are usually con- 
sidered separate units. Thus cohabiting couples would appear as two sep- 
arate units. In the past several years the CPS has refined its procedure to 
allow easier identification of cohabiting couples. Moreover, it is possible to 
infer cohabiting couples in earlier years.* But we are also seeking to cre- 
ate units that are logically joined for benefit purposes since we estimate 
changes in benefits. Cohabiters are generally not included in the filing unit 
for benefits. Thus we choose to maintain the standard census definition of 
family whereby cohabiters are not included in the unit. There has been 
growth in cohabitation in recent years, but based on our previous work, we 
do not think treating cohabiters separately would change poverty trends 
much, though poverty would likely be slightly lower with a more inclusive 
definition of the unit. 
Young versus Old 
In this study we have also chosen to limit our attention to families with 
household heads who are under sixty years of age. The work, retirement 
activity, and benefit structures are very different for older persons. Retire- 
ment patterns have changed over time in both countries. Britain has expe- 
rienced a large growth in occupational pension schemes that have raised 
the incomes  of pensioners.  In both countries, pension  benefits  will  be 
linked at least partly to past earnings, which we cannot model or observe 
in this cross-sectional data. Thus we have chosen to limit our sample to 
households where the worker is unlikely to be retired or a pensioner. 
8.2  The Trends in Relative and Absolute Poverty in 
the United States and Great Britain 
Figure 8.2 shows the trends in relative poverty in Britain and the United 
States between 1979 and 1999 using our gross income before housing, 60 
percent median income standard for households with a head under age 
sixty. 
8. See Ellwood (2000) for a detailed description of how this can be done. The Determinants of Changing Poverty and Whether Work Will Work  321 
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Fig. 8.2  Relative poverty in Britain and the U.S., households headed by someone 
under age 60 
Sources: Authors’ tabulations of annual FES surveys and March CPS surveys. 
Note: Poverty is based on gross income, including benefits before housing. 
In 1979, the countries were far apart in relative poverty. Poverty in 
Britain was 13 percent; in the United States it was over 26 percent. In 
the following twenty years poverty grew in both countries, but poverty 
growth was much greater in Britain than the United States. Between 
1979 and 1999, poverty rose 11 percentage points in Britain, while ris- 
ing “just” 4 points in the United States. 
The British trends are quite consistent with those reported by Goodman, 
Johnson, and Webb (1997) and Department of Social Security (1999), as 
well as those reported for Britain and the United States in Gottschalk and 
Smeeding (  1997).9 
Figure 8.3  shows the measures of absolute poverty. It illustrates absolute 
poverty in both countries using the 60 percent median 1979 income ab- 
solute standard, and it shows poverty in the United States using the official 
U.S.  measure. 
In contrast to the relative measures, absolute poverty in both countries 
mostly follows a rather clear cyclical path, rising during the recessions 
9. Note that since 1993 poverty rates have fallen slightly in the United States and there are 
some signs that poverty is beginning to fall in Britain. Dickens and Ellwood (2003) analyze 
more recent changes in child poverty (up to 2001) and show that since the advent of the Clin- 
ton and Blair administrations relative child poverty has fallen by about 3 percentage points. 322  Richard Dickens and David T. Ellwood 
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Sources: Authors’ tabulations of annual FES surveys and March CPS surveys. 
Note: Poverty is based on gross income, including benefits before housing. 
Absolute poverty in Britain and the US.,  households headed by someone 
of 1982-1983, falling in the mid-l980s, rising again in 1992  1993, and 
falling back sharply in recent years. 
Not surprisingly, the choice of poverty standard for the United States 
makes a big difference in the level of absolute poverty. The vastly lower offi- 
cial standard leads to half the poverty rate that one might have projected 
otherwise. 
When one compares absolute U.S. poverty using the official standard 
and absolute poverty in Britain using a 60 percent median 1979 in- 
come standard, the poverty rates are much closer. The U.S. standard is 
somewhat lower ($17,356 in 1999 vs. the purchasing power equivalent 
of $20,047 for the absolute standard in Britain) and so poverty is some- 
what lower in the United States, but the trends remain similar. 
Figures 8.2 and 8.3 reveal why it is important to be clear about whether 
one is comparing relative or absolute poverty. Using either measure, the 
United  States does not perform  very well, but relative poverty  makes 
Britain’s performance  seem far  worse than that  of  the  United  States: 
poverty grew vastly more in Britain. Using absolute poverty, Britain has 
done as well or better than the United States in recent years. As noted ear- 
lier, we will exclusively use the U.S. official poverty standard in exploring 
absolute poverty for the United States in the remainder of the paper. 
What, then, explains the trends over time and, in particular, the differ- The Determinants of Changing Poverty and Whether Work Will Work  323 
ential performance in relative poverty? There are many possible explana- 
tions for these changes-a  rise in single-parent families, rising wage in- 
equality, changing work patterns, or  altered government aid.  The challenge 
for this paper is to understand these trends. 
8.3  Possible Explanations for the Changing Patterns of Poverty 
The trends for Britain described above are relatively well known. A vari- 
ety of important work has already been done exploring the role of demo- 
graphic and economic factors. We summarize several explanations in the 
following subsections. 
8.3.1  Changing Demographic Patterns 
Goodman, Johnson, and Webb (1997), Davies and Joshi (1998), and 
many others document the changing mix of  demographic characteristics 
among the poor. In both the United States and Britain, a rising share of 
families are headed by women, and these families have far higher poverty 
rates than husband-wife families. Thus, in Britain, for example, lone par- 
ents with children have risen from 5 percent of those in the bottom income 
quintile in the early 1960s to 15 percent by the early 1990s. 
8.3.2  Changing Wage Patterns 
Real wages have risen in Britain over much of this period, but so too has 
wage dispersion. Machin (1999) reports that median male wages rose from 
E6.13 in 1980 to E7.57 in 1996. Yet during the same period the ratio of 
wages of men at the 90th percentile of the hourly wage distribution to those 
at the  10th percentile rose from  3.10 in  1975 to 3.96 in  1996. Similar 
changes occurred for women. Uniformly rising wages would have relatively 
little impact on relative poverty, but the widening dispersion would push 
such poverty up. (Of course, if incomes in work are rising faster than in- 
comes out of  work then relative poverty will rise with growing earnings, 
even if wage dispersion did not grow, because median incomes would rise 
and more people without earnings would fall below the poverty standard.) 
By  contrast, a uniform rise in wages would reduce absolute poverty (as 
more people are pulled above the fixed standard) but growing dispersion 
would work in the opposite direction. Since average wages grew in Britain 
and the dispersion widened, wage patterns seem likely to have pushed up 
relative poverty and had ambiguous impacts on absolute deprivation. 
In sharp contrast to Britain, Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt (1999) re- 
port that median wages of men in the United States fell from $14.37 to 
$12.80 between 1980 and 1998. But like Britain the 90-10 ratio rose over the 
period, from 3.62 to 4.51. For women, median wages actually rose from 
$9.13 to $10.00, but the 90-10 ratio grew even more than it did for men, 
from 2.85 to 3.89. Thus it would seem that wage changes for men in the 324  Richard Dickens and David T. Ellwood 
United States would increase both absolute and relative poverty, while pat- 
terns for women would increase relative poverty at least. 
8.3.3  Changing Employment and the Pattern of “Worklessness” 
Unemployment in Britain rose sharply over a large stretch of the recent 
period but has since fallen to a twenty-year low of around 5 percent. Nev- 
ertheless, the nonemployment rate of men has remained high due to a large 
increase in inactivity, particularly among older, less skilled men. Further- 
more, since the mid 1970s there has been a significant polarization of work 
across households, so that by the late 1990s 17 percent of all households 
were without work as described in Gregg, Hansen, and Wadsworth (1999) 
and Gregg and Wadsworth  (2000). These households contain 4 million 
adults (1 3 percent) and 2.6 million children (1 8 percent). Some 70 percent 
of these workless households are poor, and this rises to 90 percent where 
children are present. Ercolani and Jenkins (1 998) use shift-share analysis 
to show that the small increases in income inequality in the first half of the 
1990s occur within and not between work-rich and work-poor households. 
We suspect that such polarization may have been more important in influ- 
encing poverty in earlier periods and perhaps later periods as well. 
By contrast, in the United States, employment levels seem to be high and 
growing in recent years. Unemployment rates are extremely low by U.S. 
standards. A number  of authors, including Blank, Card, and Robbins 
(2000), Ellwood (2000), and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000), have empha- 
sized the sharp rise in work among single mothers in the United States in 
recent years. There has been some decline in work among men over this pe- 
riod, a trend that some authors attribute to expanded disability benefits, 
though this conclusion remains quite 
8.3.4 
Social policies are generally designed to mitigate hardships caused by 
low incomes that result from limited work, low pay, or single parenthood. 
Thus one would expect them to dampen the impact of the other factors 
cited above. In addition, social policies in Britain and the United States 
have undergone repeated “reforms” over the past quarter-century. Benefits 
have risen and fallen. New programs have been added. Some have been 
eliminated and most recently in both countries, governments have moved 
toward a more work-oriented strategy, including expanded tax credits for 
workers, and at least some increase in work expectations. Policy changes 
obviously influence poverty both directly, by affecting the total income that 
individuals and families in a particular situation receive, and by altering 
behavior. There is a sizeable body of work in both countries examining the 
Social Policy Structures and “Reforms” 
10. See, for example, Bound and Waidmann (1992), DeLeire (2000), Gruber and Kubik 
(1994), and Haveman (1991). The  Determinants of Changing Poverty and Whether Work Will Work  325 
role that social policies and incentives can have on work behavior and 
poverty.  ' 
All  of  these  factors-demography,  work, wages,  and benefits-may 
have influenced policy in complex ways. We propose to extend the work of 
others on each of these individual topics by decomposing the altered pat- 
terns of poverty over time into the relative roles that each of these factors 
may have played. The work of Goodman, Johnson, and Webb (1997) offer 
the closest analogy, but their focus is primarily on inequality and they seek 
to decompose the aggregate level of inequality into various components, 
whereas we are more narrowly focused on poverty and will do the decom- 
position on a more micro level.'* 
8.4  Decomposing the Trends in Poverty among Families and Working Age 
Adults: Aggregate Methods and Micromethods 
There are two different strategies one might pursue in seeking to parse 
the changing patterns of poverty-one  using aggregate data at its heart 
and the other using microdata. While we always intended to rely primarily 
on the use of a time series of cross-sectional microdata for our work, we ini- 
tially  tried  estimating  some aggregate models because their  simplicity 
makes them relatively easy to perform and common in the literature. 
8.4.1  Aggregate Analyses 
Blank and Blinder (1986), Blank and Card (1993), and Cutler and Katz 
(1991) are among the chief contributors to the literature that seeks to ex- 
plain variations in poverty using aggregate data in the United States, while 
Gregg and Machin  (1995) and Nolan (1986) have done key  work  for 
Britain. The basic strategy has typically been to regress aggregate poverty 
rates on factors such as unemployment rates, mean wages, inflation rates, 
gross domestic product (GDP), demographic measures, government bene- 
fit levels, and so on. 
Unfortunately, when we estimated such models we found them to be un- 
stable and quite sensitive to specification. This should presumably come as 
no surprise given the time series nature of the data. Especially when we 
tried to separately identify wage levels, wage dispersion, unemployment, 
worklessness, and government benefits, we  found that the results had no 
power at all. Aggregate methods by their very nature cannot do  a very good 
job of distinguishing spurious from real effects. Thus we turned to micro- 
methods for our analysis. 
11. See, for example, Blundell (2000), Blundell et al. (2000), Gregg, Johnson, and Reed 
12. Goodman, Johnson, and Webb (1997) do have a chapter on poverty, but they do not 
(1999), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000), and Moffitt (1992). 
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8.4.2  Micromethodology 
The overall aim of this paper can probably best be represented with the 
question, “What would the poverty rate have been today if the structure of 
wages, work, or benefits had remained at some base-year level?” For ex- 
ample, since 1979 the distribution of wages has widened considerably, but 
employment, family structures, and benefit structures have changed  as 
well. Thus a natural first question would be to ask how different the poverty 
rate would have been in 1999 had the distribution of wages been the same 
as in 1979 while everything else was at the actual 1999 level. This kind of 
experiment essentially requires that we assign each person who was work- 
ing in 1999 a wage that an equivalent person would have earned in 1979, 
and then recalculate the poverty rate. A similar methodology can also be 
applied to work and benefit structures. 
For all members of the sample in any given year, we estimate each per- 
son’s and family’s work, wages, and benefits given the structures of pay, em- 
ployment, or benefits in a chosen base year. We can then estimate what 
poverty would have been if the base-year conditions still prevailed. For this 
work we need to look at individual family income. A family is poor if their 
equivalized family income is below the poverty threshold. 
nadulti 
Total Income, =  (wage,, .  hours,)  + govtben, + othinc, 
i-  I 
where 
Total Income, = total family income for the family at time t, 
nadults, = number of adults in the family, 
wage,, = wage of adult i at time t, 
hours,, = hours worked by adult i at time t, 
govtben, = government benefits received by family at time t,  and 
othinc, = other income of the family at time t. 
We  would like to have a model of each of the key variables above- 
wages, hours, and government benefits-that  would allow us to explore 
what might have happened had wage or work or government benefit pat- 
terns been different. 
8.4.3  Wages 
For each year we estimate the following wage equation: 
wage,, = Y(K,)  + E,, 
where 4,  = measured characteristics of the person at time t. 
In practice, we estimate separate wage equations for men and women in 
each year. The characteristics included vary somewhat across Britain and 
the United States. Both include age and education dummies and number 
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We will need a wage prediction for everyone (aged over sixteen) in the 
sample in each year t because under some assumptions more people will be 
working. This is relatively straightforward. We predict an  individual’s wage 
in year t based on their characteristics y,.  For those with an observed wage 
we assign them their actual residual from the wage equation (the predicted 
wage in year t is therefore the observed wage in that year for people who al- 
ready work). For those who are not working we do not observe a residual 
and so randomly assign them a residual from the year-t residual distribu- 
tion. This gives us predicted wages in year t for all individuals in the sample 
without changing the distribution. Of course, if more people worked the 
distribution might change even beyond that predicted by the model. Those 
who did not initially work might be drawn from the lower tail of the wage 
distribution. Much of this is already accounted for in the base prediction, 
which does depend on measured characteristics. We  experimented with 
Heckman-type selection models in this work. In principle, nothing pre- 
vents their use, but we lacked a good selection instrument and found that 
including these selection equations did little to change our results. Thus we 
have chosen instead to maintain the original distribution. 
We then want to predict an individual’s wage in year t given the wage 
structure of some base year s. To do this we need to account for the impact 
of the implicitly different returns to measured characteristics 4,  in the base 
years, but we also need to take account of the changed distribution of the 
error term between years and year t.  We predict wages using the following 
methodology: 
wage;, = ~(4,)  + E,(errorptile,,) 
- 
where 
wage;, = predicted wage for person i in year t using the wage distribution 
Xt,  = measured characteristics of the person at time t, 
E,  = the observed residual distribution function in the wage equation for 
years, and 
errorptile,  = the observed percentile of the residual of person  i in the 
year-t wage equation. 
We use each person’s characteristics in year t in the base-year s wage 
equation. To determine what the predicted error would be in the base-year 
equation, we assume that the person’s percentile ranking in the unexplained 
variance of wages remains unchanged in the two time periods. Thus if the 
residual E,, for the person i in the year-t wage equation placed the person in 
the 37th percentile of the residual distribution, he or she would be assigned 
the residual of the 37th percentile of the distribution in years. This method 
thus preserves both the ranking of the individual’s unobserved compo- 
nents of earnings over time while adjusting for altered levels of unexplained 
variance in pay over time. 
-  - 
of year s, 328  Richard Dickens and David T. Ellwood 
A problem arises with those individuals for whom we do  not observe a 
wage in year t.  We chose to randomly assign a residual for these individu- 
als from the year-s residual distribution. This methodology allows us to 
predict wages for all individuals in each year, whether they work or not, 
given the current-year or base-year wage equation. 
8.4.4  Work 
There are two components to our work specification: the participation 
decision and the choice of hours of work. We treat these separately. First, 
we estimate an equation each year that describes whether an individual 
works: 
works1  = L,(X,,,  Z,,)  + Vlt 
where 
workll = 1 if person i is working in year t and 0 if person i is not working in 
4,  = measured characteristics of person i at time t as in the wage equation, 
Z,, = measured household characteristics of person i at time t. 
4,  is the same as specified above. Zt,  includes the number of children, 
spouse’s  education, and other nonlabor,  nonbenefit  income.  And, for 
women in couples, we also include the partner’s work status to account for 
covariance in work decisions of couples. We estimate this equation sepa- 
rately for men and women and for individuals in different household types 
(husbands or wives, single household heads with other household mem- 
bers, single heads with no other members, and other household members). 
We now want a prediction of the work status of person i in year t given 
the work specification of some base years. Our aim here in predicting work 
status in year t given the work equation of year s is to change the status of 
as few people as possible  from  their  actual status observed  in  year  t. 
Clearly, to the extent there are aggregate changes in work we need to adjust 
the work status of at least some individuals. Hence we predict work status 
in the following way: 
year t, 
and 
P(work):, -  P(work);, 
1 -  P(work):, 
If work,, = 0 and P(work);, -  P(work):, >  0 and y < 
~ - 
then work;, = 1. 
P(work):, -  P(work):, 
P(work);, 
If work,, = 1 and P(work);, -  P(work):, <  0 and y < 
- 
~ 
then wore, = 0, 
-  - 
otherwise wore, = work,,. The Determinants of Changing Poverty and Whether Work Will Work  329 
-  __ 
wore, = predicted  work status of person i in year  t given year-s work 
work,, = observed work status of person i in year t, 
P(work);, = Lh(Xlt,  Z,z)  is the predicted work probability of person i in year 
P(work):, = L,(Xl,,  Zl,)  is the predicted work probability of person i in year 
yis  a uniformly distributed random number for person i. 
Thus, to construct thxedicted  work status of person i in year t under the 
year-s specification wore,, we apply the following procedure. Initially we 
assign the person a predicted work status that is equal to his or her ob- 
served work status. We then compare the person’s predicted probability of 
work in year t under the year-t equation, P(work):, ,  with that predicted by 
the year-s equation, P(work);r. If an  individual’s P(work);, >  P(work):, and 
the person is already working, we do nothing; as predicted, the odds of work- 
ing have increased. If the person is not now working (and 1 -  P(work):, of 
such individuals will not be working), then there is some chance the person 
would in fact have gone to work. To assure that the fraction working 
matches the predicted probabilities, we need to randomly assign some of 
the individuals who are not working into work based on the difference in 
their predicted work probabilities and the odds that the person is not now 
working. This can be done on an individual basis using the equations 
above. However, if P(work);, < P(work):, then we need to assign some in- 
dividuals who are working out of work. Again, we randomly assign a pro- 
portion of these workers out of work. These proportions are specified such 
that the overall proportion in work in year t under the year-s specification 
corresponds to that predicted by  the year-s work equation given year-t 
characteristics. 
specification, 
t using the year-s work equation, 
t usign the year-t work equation, and 
__ 
8.4.5  Hours 
als with positive hours of work: 
Second, we estimate an hours equation for each year for those individu- 
how,  = H,(Y,,  2,)  + rl,, 
where 
hoursl, = hours worked by person i in year t (for those with positive hours), 
y,  = measured characteristics of the person at time t, and 
Z,, = measured household characteristics of person i at time t. 
Again we estimate this equation separately for men and women and for 
different household types (as discussed above). In order to obtain a pre- 
diction of the work hours of person i in year t under the base-year s equa- 
tion we apply the same method as employed with wages. 330  Richard Dickens and David T. Ellwood 
hours;, = Hs(X,,)  + q5(errorptilel,) 
where 
hours;, = predicted hours for person i in year t using the hours distribution 
X,, = measured characteristics of the person at time t, 
ZL,  = measured household characteristics of person i at time t, 
q,  = the observed residual distribution function in the hours equation for 
years, and 
errorptile, = the observed percentile of the residual of person i in the year- 
t hours equation. 
We use each person’s individual and household characteristics in year t 
in the base-year s hours equation. To determine what the predicted error 
would be in the base-year equation, we assume that the person’s percentile 
ranking in the unexplained variance of hours remains unchanged in the two 
time periods. For those who are not working in year t we randomly assign 
a residual from the year-s residual distribution. 
of years, 
8.4.6  Benefits 
In our benefit specification we need to predict both whether a household 
is in receipt of benefits and the amount received. Ideally we would like to 
have access to a benefit model that uses observed household characteristics 
to predict the amount of benefit entitlement. In the absence of such a 
model we employ a regression-based approach, using observed individual 
and household  characteristics to predict benefit receipt. As with work, 
there are two components to our benefit specification: First, we  need to 
model whether the household is in receipt of benefits, and then the benefit 
amount. 
We estimate a benefit receipt equation for each household head i as fol- 
lows: 
hew, = R,(X!,,  T,)  + t,, 
where 
benp,t = 1 if household i is receiving benefits in year t,  and 0 if household i 
X!,  = measured characteristics of household head i at time t,  and 
Y,,  = measured characteristics of household i at time t. 
We estimate this equation separately for our different household types (see 
above). Yll  includes own education dummies, spouse’s education dummies, 
own hours of work, spouse’s hours of work, number of adults, number of 
children, household earnings dummies, and nonwage income dummies. 
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For the United States we also include the state maximum Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) level, whether the head has a disability, 
and whether the head was a widow, 
We wish to predict the benefit participation of households in year t given 
a base-year s benefit participation equation. We  employ an analogous 
methodology to that described above in terms of work participation. 
P(benp)s, -  P(benP):,  If benpLt  = 0 and P(benp);, -  P(benp):, >  0 and  < 
1 -  P(benp);, 
-  - 
then benp;, = 1. 
~ - 
then benp;, = 0, 
___  __ 
otherwise benp;, = benpl, 
benp;, = predicted benefit status of household head i in year t given year-s 
benpt, = observed benefit status of household head i in year t, 
P(benp);, = Rs(Xl,,  Z!,)  is the benefit participation probability of house- 




hold head i in year t, using the year-s benefit equation, 
hold head i in year t, using the year-t benefit equation, and 
is a uniformly distributed random number for household head i. 
8.4.7  Benefit Amounts 
Finally, we  require a prediction of the monetary amount of benefit re- 
ceipt for each year. Our goal is to model as nearly as possible the mechan- 
ical relationship between a family's earnings and other characteristics and 
the amount of benefits they receive. Clearly the decision to work and the 
level of earnings that people have will be endogenous. But conditional on 
work and earnings benefits are not endogenous, they are a function of the 
rules of the benefit regime. In later work for Britain, we may use the Insti- 
tute for Fiscal Studies Taxben model to get more accurate estimates of be- 
nefit entitlement. But we do not have such a model for the United States, 
and we  seek to have as comparable a model as possible between the two 
countries. We run the following regression for each household head sepa- 
rately for our different household types and also separately for households 
with and without children: 
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where 
benefits,, = benefit receipt of household head i at time t, 
X,, = measured characteristics of head of household i at time t,  and 
Y,, = measured characteristics of household i at time t. 
In order to obtain a prediction of benefit receipts of household head i in 
year t under the base-year s equation we  apply the same method as em- 
ployed with wages and hours above. 
benefits  I, = By(&,, Y,,)  + $s(errorptile,,) 
where 
benefits;, = predicted benefits for household head i in year t using the be- 
Xt,  = measured characteristics of household head i at time t, 
Z,,  = measured household characteristics at time t, 
$, = the observed residual distribution function in the benefits equation 
errorptile,, = the observed percentile of the residual of household head i in 
nefits distribution of year s, 
for years, and 
the year-t benefits equation. 
We use each household head’s individual and household characteristics in 
year tin the base-year s benefits equation. To determine what the predicted 
error would be in the base-year equation, we assume that the household’s 
percentile ranking  in the unexplained  variance of benefits remains un- 
changed in the two time periods. For those who are not in benefit receipt in 
year t we randomly assign a residual from the year-s distribution. 
We now have a predicted wage, work status, hours, and benefit status 
and receipt for every person in our sample in each year t. In addition, we 
have a prediction in each year t given the wage, work, and benefits specifi- 
cation of the base years. This allows us to answer questions such as “What 
would household income, and hence poverty, be in year t given the wage, 
work, or benefit specification and residuals from years?” 
8.5  Results: The Forces Shaping Poverty in 
Great Britain and the United States 
With this methodology we can pose a blistering array of hypothetical 
“what-if” scenarios. What would  happen  to poverty if  wages had  re- 
mained as they were in  1979 (or in  1984 or any other year) but demo- 
graphic, work, and benefit patterns had all evolved as they did in actuality? 
What if the demographics only had changed? We have chosen 1979 as our 
base year partly because it just precedes most of the burst of inequality and 
policy change in both countries. We could have selected any year. Our ba- The  Determinants of Changing Poverty and Whether Work Will Work  333 
sic question is straightforward: what factors caused the sharp changes in 
poverty? 
We settled on an additive approach to understanding the changes. We 
start with everything as it was in 1979, and add in one change at a time. We 
begin  by  projecting  what  poverty  would  have  been  had  demographic 
changes alone occurred. Methodologically, this involves estimating what 
work, wages, and benefits would have been in every year applying 1979 
models (with their residuals) to the actual characteristics of the population 
in each year. Because family structures, education, and ages would have 
changed over time, work, wages, and benefits would have changed some- 
what and poverty would have been changed as well. The change in poverty 
created by this model is the estimated impact of demographics. Next, we 
projected poverty with wages and demographics set to their actual levels 
while work  and benefits were kept at their  1979 1e~el.l~  The change in 
poverty from the previously measured impact of demographics alone indi- 
cates the impact of altered wage patterns. Then, we calculated poverty al- 
lowing demographics, wages, and work to change, but still keeping gov- 
ernment benefits at their 1979 base le~e1.l~  The net change in poverty now 
is the work effect. Finally, the change from this to actual poverty is the im- 
pact of changes in benefits. 
This type of decomposition involves several critical assumptions. The 
most obvious is that each change is being treated as though it were exoge- 
nous. But, of course, demographic changes may, in part, be the result of 
wage or benefit changes. Wage changes may be influenced by the fraction 
of people working. Work patterns will surely be influenced by wage and be- 
nefit patterns. These results thus must be seen as partial effects-not  cap- 
turing any behavioral impacts. The place where this is most at issue is the 
potential impact of government benefits on work and worklessness. In the 
later sections of this paper, we shall confront this issue directly. Here we do 
adjust benefits for altered earnings, but not vice versa. 
The other obvious feature of using this additive approach is that the 
decomposition it yields is somewhat path dependent. Depending on the 
order we  added changes, the fraction attributed to various factors could 
differ. In our experiments, the order makes surprisingly little difference, 
13. For most persons we use their actual wage multiplied by their predicted work hours if 
conditions had remained as in  1979. If some people were projected to work in a particular 
year who were not projected to work in 1979, we use an imputed wage for them. 
14. We actually estimated two effects: first, the projected poverty if benefits remained ex- 
actly at the level we predicted each family would have received in 1979 had their work and 
wages been as predicted using models for 1979. Then we projected poverty after allowing for 
the fact that under 1979 rules, benefits would have adjusted to the changed economic situa- 
tion. This is the income stabilization  effect of the benefit systems. In these charts, the lines are 
shown assuming benefits were set at the 1979 levels when work and wages wcre also set in 
1979.  Thus when we change wages or work we get the pure impact on poverty, not net of a sta- 
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Fig. 8.4  Components of change in relative poverty in Britain since 1979 
though the order in which work or wage changes are added makes some 
difference in the United Kingdom because slightly more people are af- 
fected by wage changes when work levels are kept at 1979 levels. 
Because we estimate changed outcomes for every member of our sample, 
we can report on a very wide range of impacts. In each nation, we can look 
at effects on any possible measure of poverty for any demographic or fam- 
ily group. Here, we have chosen to report on relative and absolute poverty 
overall, and for four family subgroups: couples with  children,  couples 
without children, singles with children, and singles without children. Note 
that “singles without children” is not necessarily a household with only 
one member (e.g., in a small number of cases it includes grown children or 
other adults). With two nations, two poverty measures, and four family 
groupings, we have sixteen different combinations to report about-and 
for each there is a different impact of demographics, wages, work, and 
public aid. Obviously we will not be able to comment fully on each of these, 
and many detailed results can be found in Dickens and Ellwood (2001). 
Figure 8.4 illustrates the various impacts on relative poverty in Britain. 
It shows how each change would have altered poverty. The impacts are also 
summarized in the first column of the top part of table 8.1. The figure and 
table reveal a very straightforward and reasonable story. 
Demographics,  wage  change,  and increased  worklessness  all con- 
tributed considerably to growing relative poverty in Britain through- The Determinants of Changing Poverty and Whether Work Will Work  335 
Table 8.1  Decomposition of Changes in Poverty between 1979 and 1999, by Family 
Type (“/.I 
Great Britain  United States 
Relative  Absolute  Relative  Absolute 
Poverty (“h)  Poverty (YO)  Poverty (YO)  Poverty (“h) 
Poverty in 1979 
+ Demographics 
+ Wages 
+ Work patterns 
+ Government benefits 
= Poverty in 1999 
Poverty in 1979 
+ Demographics 
+ Wages 
+ Work patterns 
+ Government benefits 
= Poverty in 1999 
Poverty in 1979 
+ Demographics 
+ Wages 
+ Work patterns 
+ Government benefits 
= Poverty in 1999 
Poverty in 1979 
+ Demographics 
+ Wages 
+ Work patterns 
+ Government benefits 
= Poverty in 1999 
Poverty in 1979 
+ Demographics 
+ Wages 
+ Work patterns 
+ Government benefits 
= Poverty in 1999 
All Persons 
13.0  13.0 
+5.4  +1.2 
i4.6  +O.l 
f5.1  +6.3 
-3.1  -6.8 
24.4  14.5 
Couples with Children 
13.1  13.1 
+2.1  -2.2 
+  5.3  +0.8 
+  3.8  +5.4 
-2.3  -3.4 
22.6  13.7 
Couples without Children 
3.5  3.5 
+0.9  +0.3 
+2.8  +0.4 
+3.1  +3.1 
-1.9  3.1 
9.0  4.9 
Singles with Children 
48.3  48.3 
+11.9  +2.5 
+6.9  +0.8 
+8.4  +  12.0 
-10.9  -26.5 
64.7  37.2 
Singles without Children 
13.3  13.3 
+3.8  i1.0 
+2.1  +0.2 
+ 10.5  +  10.6 
-6.5  -10.2 
23.9  15.0 
26.2  10.4 
+3.3  +1.2 
+1.3  +1.2 
-0.8  -2.3 
+o.o  +0.3 
30.0  10.9 
23.4  6.4 
+2.1  +0.8 
+2.2  +1.4 
-1.7  -2.4 
+0.1  +o.o 
26.8  6.4 
9.5  2.5 
+2.3  +0.4 
+0.7  +0.3 
-0.5  -0.3 
0.3  -0.0 
11.7  2.8 
63.9  36.9 
-2.3  -5.1 
-0.6  +2.3 
-0.2  -6.5 
+0.3  +1.4 
61.1  29.0 
26.6  15.0 
i2.6  +0.3 
+0.9  +0.9 
+O.l  -0.5 
-0.1  +0.4 
30.8  16.0 
out the 1979-1999  period. Demographic changes alone pushed pov- 
erty from roughly 13.0 percent up to 18.4 percent. Wages moved the 
rate up another 4.6  points to 23.0 percent. Worklessness raised poverty 
another 5.1 points to 28.1 percent. On the other hand, government be- 
nefits expanded over the period and, ignoring any behavioral impacts, 336  Richard Dickens and David T.  Ellwood 
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Fig. 8.5  Components of change in absolute poverty in Britain since 1979 
reduced poverty to 24.4 percent-3.7  points lower than it would have 
been in the absence of expansion. 
We should point out that much of the increase in benefits was in the form 
of increased housing benefit arising from increased rents. This is subject to 
interpretation and we will return to this below. Also, it is worth noting that 
the role of worklessness was larger during the mid- 1980s and mid- 1990s, 
when overall levels of unemployment were much higher.” 
Figure 8.5 and the second column of table 8.1 shows the same informa- 
tion for absolute poverty, and a rather different picture emerges. 
In sharp contrast to relative poverty, neither demographic nor wage 
changes had a large net impact  on absolute poverty. Demographic 
changes alone would have pushed up absolute poverty from 13.0 per- 
cent to 14.2 percent. Wage changes had a small impact of 0.7 points. 
On the other hand, work changes had a very large impact on absolute 
poverty, pushing it up from 15 percent to over 21 percent. Indeed, the 
only reason absolute poverty did not rise much over this period was a 
large  increase in  government  aid, which  pushed  absolute poverty 
down by almost 7 points below what it would have been. 
15. When we use the more standard definition of relative poverty based upon half meun con- 
temporary income in Britain we find the role of work diminished and a larger impact from 
wages and demographic change. Since mean wages have risen faster than median wages this 
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Fig. 8.6  Components of change in relative poverty in the US.  since 1979 
Figures 8.6 and 8.7 and the last two columns of table 8.1 show similar de- 
compositions of poverty for the United States. A very different pattern 
emerges: 
Demographic and wage changes in the United States had smaller im- 
pacts on relative poverty as in Great Britain. On the other hand, wages 
played a slightly larger role in raising absolute poverty in the United 
States than in Britain. 
Moreover, in very sharp contrast to Britain, work changes signifi- 
cantly reduced absolute poverty and slightly reduced relative poverty 
in the United States, and the direct effects of changes in government 
aid were almost negligible by  1999. (Figure 8.7 actually shows that in 
the mid-1980s policies increased poverty slightly, in the early 1990s 
they reduced it, and by  1999, the impact was roughly zero.) 
In interpreting these results, one must again remember that what is be- 
ing measured is the effect of benefit (or wage or work) changes on poverty 
changes. The zero impacts for government benefits in table 8.1 for the 
United States does not mean that the level of government aid did not re- 
duce poverty below what it would have been, only that changes in aid rela- 
tive to 1979 did not affect changes in poverty. And indirect effects through 
behavioral changes remain to be considered. 
The bottom four parts of table 8.1 display a plethora of results showing 












E  0.10 
0.05 
0.00 
-  Actual Poverty: Benefit, Work, Wage, and Demographic Change 
-  -Work,  Wage, and Demographic Change 
- - - Wage and Demographic  Change Only 
-  Demographic Change Only 
1978  1983  1988  1993  1998 
Year 
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detail is available in Dickens and Ellwood (2001, tables A lLA4). In reading 
these results, it is important to remember that the experiment being con- 
templated is changing demographics or wages for everyone, not just the 
subgroup. A factor can have an effect on the relative poverty of a group 
even if it does not affect the income of the group, provided it changes mean 
incomes overall and hence the poverty line. Thus the change in wages has 
large effects on relative poverty of single mothers (who do not work a great 
deal) because the higher overall mean wages result in a higher relative 
poverty standard, which in turn leads more single mothers to be counted 
as poor. 
The many results in table 8.1 are too numerous to summarize, but a few 
key points do stand out: 
Among couples in Britain, work and pay changes are the big story: 
Wage changes pushed up relative poverty significantly, work declines 
pushed up relative poverty somewhat and absolute poverty quite con- 
siderably. 
Among couples in the United States, work and wages are the story 
also, but in a different way. Wage changes did push up relative and ab- 
solute poverty somewhat, but work changes diminished both relative 
and absolute poverty. 
For single parents, the most striking findings involve work and be- 
nefits. In Britain, falling work pushes up poverty, especially absolute The Determinants  of Changing Poverty and Whether Work Will Work  339 
poverty, while rising aid dramatically cuts poverty-reducing  absolute 
poverty by an astonishing 27 percentage points. In the United States, 
rising work of single parents apparently reduced absolute poverty a 
great deal, though this was partly offset by government benefit cuts, 
But, intriguingly, the changes in work have virtually no impact on rel- 
ative poverty. 
For singles without children, in Britain, the story is again one of re- 
duced work being offset by higher benefits. In the United States, nei- 
ther of these factors appears to be important. 
What seems to emerge overall, then, is a story in which 
Demographic change pushed up poverty in both nations, but far more 
for relative than absolute poverty. 
Changing wages pushed up relative poverty in both nations, but had a 
small impact on absolute poverty in Britain and only a modest nega- 
tive impact on absolute poverty in the United States. 
Changing work patterns increased poverty in Britain and reduced it in 
the United States, but in both countries the impacts are larger on ab- 
solute than relative poverty. 
The direct effect of changing government benefits since 1979 was to re- 
duce poverty considerably in Britain while having essentially no im- 
pact in the United States. 
8.6  Understanding How Demographic, Wage, and 
Work Changes Influenced Poverty 
These somewhat divergent results are actually quite plausible and fairly 
easy to understand. We briefly examine each factor in turn. 
8.6.1  Demographics 
There were two major types of demographic change in both countries. 
On the one hand, two-parent families diminished in proportion, being re- 
placed by lone parents and singles without children. The number of single- 
parent households increased from about 5 percent to 12 percent in Britain 
and from about 12 percent to 15 percent in the United States between 1979 
and 1999. As poverty rates are much higher in these settings, both absolute 
and relative poverty would be expected to rise as the mix shifted. 
At the same time, education levels rose significantly over the period. The 
increased education would have been expected to push up wages and work 
(and our models do project modest rises if 1979  work models had remained 
in place). This improvement in earnings would tend to reduce absolute 
poverty as more people moved above a fixed threshold. But its impact on 
relative poverty is ambiguous at best, since it raises incomes across the 
board. Indeed, educational change could act to increase relative poverty 340  Richard Dickens and David T.  Ellwood 
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both because education rises could have been greater in the upper per- 
centiles and because low-percentile families are far less likely to be work- 
ing and thus would not see the impact of any wage rise associated with 
higher education. 
Changing demographics pushed  up relative poverty  due to altered 
family structures and rising education. But demographic effects on ab- 
solute poverty reflect the partially offsetting forces of changing family 
structures and rising education. 
8.6.2  Wages 
The picture for wages in Britain has much the same flavor: unambiguous 
increases in relative poverty, offsetting forces for absolute deprivation. Fig- 
ures 8.8 and 8.9 show the well-known trends in wages for men and women 
in  Great Britain  using the FES. Mean and median hourly wages rose 
sharply, but the distribution also spread considerably. The striking fact on 
these figures is that wages for men and women in the 10th percentile rose 
only slightly over this period, particularly for men. Relative poverty essen- 
tially measures inequality, so the widening distribution increased poverty 
regardless of the growth of the mean. And since absolute poverty captures 
what is happening to incomes of people at the bottom, the fact that wages 
were essentially unchanged at the lower tail left absolute poverty essentially 
untouched. In effect, the beneficial effects of rising mean pay were offset by 
the negative impacts of a widening pay distribution. 
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Fig. 8.10  Real wages in the U.S. for males working at least half time 
tions also widened, but for men at least, there was no concomitant rise in 
mean pay. Indeed, the pay of men in the 10th percentile fell from $7.06 to 
$5.91 in 1993, before recovering somewhat to $6.36 by 1999. Such a change 
inevitably pushed up absolute poverty. Women’s pay rose somewhat, but 
not enough at the bottom to offset the negative impacts of male earnings. 342  Richard Dickens and David T. Ellwood 
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Rising wage inequality in both countries played a leading role in rais- 
ing relative poverty. But at the bottom of the distribution, stagnant pay 
in Britain and falling pay in the United States meant that the absolute 
level of deprivation was unaffected in the former nation and worsened 
in the latter. 
8.6.3  Work 
Figure 8.12 plots the oft-cited rise in worklessness'b  in Britain-repro- 
ducing the results of Gregg, Hansen, and Wadsworth (1999) and others. 
For every family type, worklessness has risen rather considerably since 
1979. This rise is quite remarkable since the unemployment rate is back 
down to where it had been in 1979 (as are overall employment rates) and 
wages are, on average, considerably higher. Worklessness rose from 35 per- 
cent of single-parent households in  1979 to 56 percent in  1999. Among 
couples with children, the rise was from 4.5 percent to 7.3 percent, down 
from its peak of nearly 12  percent in 1992  but still considerably higher than 
previously. In absolute terms the rises were greatest for single parents, but 
in percentage terms the rises were especially high for couples. 
The story for couples is somewhat more complex than it first appears. 
On the one hand, men in couples are working considerably less than they 
did in  1979-nonwork  has risen from 7 to 13 percent, even among men 
16. For comparability with the United States, where young adults often live at home and 
work, we define worklessness as being where neither the household head nor the partner (if 
present) works. The Determinants of Changing Poverty and Whether Work Will Work  343 
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Fig. 8.12  Percent workless households in Britain, by type of household 
with children. Simultaneously, work among women has grown even more 
dramatically.  The fraction  of  mothers working  outside the  home has 
jumped from 59 percent to 71 percent. Figure 8.1  3 shows that while work- 
lessness has risen, so too has the frequency of both men and women work- 
ing within couples. Gregg, Hansen, and Wadsworth (1  999) report this redis- 
tribution of work into work-rich and work-poor households. Bifurcation 
of work within couples almost certainly contributed to a widening family 
income distribution. 
In many respects it is a puzzle that work changes did not increase poverty 
more, especially relative poverty. Altered work did have large effects on ab- 
solute poverty. It appears that a large share of the newly workless poor 
would have previously been the working poor when one uses the higher rel- 
ative poverty standard. 
Nothing like this occurred in the United States. Figure 8.14 shows that 
workles~ness'~  is on the decline, particularly among single mothers. Less 
than 5 percent of husband-wife families with children are workless. Among 
single parents, worklessness has fallen from a peak of 44 percent in 1982 to 
its current level of 27 percent. Naturally, these patterns are relevant in ex- 
plaining poverty patterns. 
Note, however, one very important fact-the  impact of rising work in 
the United States is felt mainly in absolute, not relative, poverty. Increasing 
17. In all calculations relating to work and worklessness, we  use whether the person was 
working at the March survey date. If we defined work based on annual work hours (which 
drives our model for the United States) it would not be comparable to FES data, which are for 
a survey week. 344  Richard Dickens and David T. Ellwood 
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Fig. 8.13  Work patterns of men and women in couples in Britain 
Single With Child 
Single Without Child 
70% 
Husband-Wife Without Child 
Husband-Wife With Child 
0%  I 
1978  1983  1988  1993  1998 
Year 
Percent workless households in the United States by  type of household  Fig. 8.14 
Note: Workless is defincd as ncithcr the hcad nor thc spousc working. 
work by single parents sharply reduced absolute poverty, but had no im- 
pact on relative poverty. The obvious reason must be that the move to work 
pushed single-parent incomes up somewhat, but not high enough to get 
above the much higher relative poverty line. From the vantage point of rel- 
ative poverty, in the United States large numbers of single parents have 
gone from the nonworking poor to the working poor. The Determinants of Changing Poverty and Whether Work Will Work  345 
Work  patterns  were  radically  different  in  Britain  and the  United 
States. Worklessness is on the rise in all types of households in Britain, 
while it is falling sharply in the United States, especially among single 
parents. Interestingly, changes in work have large effects on absolute 
poverty  in  both  countries,  but  much  smaller  impacts  on relative 
poverty. Moving people to work apparently moves their incomes up 
somewhat, but often not enough to avoid relative poverty. 
8.7  The Role of Social Policies 
It is evident that in Britain and the United States benefits changed over 
time. These clearly influenced poverty, and they may be linked to changes 
in behavior. One would like to compare the benefit structures, but past 
efforts at comparison have illustrated just how difficult that can be. The 
United States has a set of overlapping programs often targeted to only a se- 
lect group of beneficiaries, such as single parents (AFDC-Temporary As- 
sistance to Needy Families), the unemployed (unemployment insurance), 
the disabled (Supplemental Security Income), working parents (EITC), 
widows (Social Security Administration-Survivors),  as well as one fairly 
general support program called “food stamps.” In Britain, although there 
are important distinctions between aid for the unemployed or disabled or 
for housing, the variations among these are quite small in comparison to 
that in the United States. 
Comparison is further complicated by the fact that much of what in- 
fluences benefit receipt and participation, especially in the United States, 
has to do with administrative procedures and the treatment of clients. 
Statutory benefit levels have not been cut dramatically in the United States 
in recent years, but by all accounts the attempt to deter potential recipients 
from getting some forms of aid (in hopes of keeping them working) and the 
stigma of getting aid have increased significantly. Sanctions have grown 
and other administrative tightening seems omnipresent. The effect of this 
is to reduce the effective benefits people actually receive. 
How then are we  to compare the nature of support in the two nations 
over time? Our benefit model provides a rather straightforward conceptual 
way of comparison. For each country and for each family type, we can ob- 
serve over time the amount of aid a family or household actually receives 
conditional on their earnings. Thus one can see how much aid a couple 
with zero earnings receives in 1979, in 1989, in 1999 and compare the lev- 
els and trends across countries. Similarly, one can compare the aid  of 
couples with earnings of 51-150,  or earnings of 5151-300,  and so on. Of 
course, this is not perfect, because the households in each category are in 
part a selected group, so there is an element of endogeneity. It is important 
to remember that we  are conditioning on earnings, and asking whether 
someone of a given earnings gets more benefits across countries and over 346  Richard Dickens and David T. Ellwood 
time-certainly  a well-defined question. Still, persons who have some con- 
dition we do not capture in the model or observe in the data that allows 
them to qualify for added aid may be more likely to be workless, and thus 
the method could not fully reflect the true potential benefit that another 
worker without this unobserved condition would get.'*  Nonetheless, coun- 
try differences and trends over time should be quite revealing. 
Let us begin by comparing the patterns for single parents because the 
differences  are so striking. Figure 8.15 shows the amount of benefits  a 
single parent in Britain received on average by weekly earnings category, 
For someone with zero earnings, benefits were roughly flat at El30 during 
most of the 1980s, then rose significantly during the 1990s to nearly El70 
in 1999. As noted before, about 65 percent of this increase was due to ris- 
ing housing aid. For someone earning from El to El50 per week, benefits 
averaged E95 and rose to f  120 by 1999. 
Compare  this to the benefits in the United States, as shown in figure 8.16. 
In deriving these and the other charts for the United States, we have ex- 
cluded the disabled and widows who have quite generous programs of sup- 
port, and who would distort the comparisons. Comparison between weekly 
benefits in pounds in Britain and annual benefits in dollars in the United 
States can be tricky. In purchasing power parity terms, if one multiplies 
weekly benefits in pounds by roughly 80, one gets annual dollars. Figure 
8.16 is scaled so that the range is roughly equivalent in annual dollars of 
purchasing power parity to that of the British benefits. Thus visual com- 
parisons between them give a sense of generosity. 
Several facts stand out immediately in the United States. First, benefits 
for zero earners have fallen throughout this period, and the fall has been 
particularly dramatic in the past five years. This trend can be traced first to 
the fact that AFDC benefits were not indexed to inflation, and then to the 
effects of welfare reforms at both the state and national levels in the early 
to mid-1990s. 
Second, benefits for those with moderate earnings-$7,500  to $1 5,000- 
dipped considerably in the early 1980s, were flat until the early 1990s, and 
then rose sharply in recent years. These former changes are the result of 
Reagan-era cutbacks in aid to working poor families on AFDC, the latter 
the effects of the dramatic expansions in the EITC. There is one mild puzzle 
here. Benefits have begun to drift down again. This appears to be the result 
18. The extreme example of this situation would be a disability program that paid vastly 
higher benefits to the disabled, but that others could not qualify for. Failing to control for dis- 
ability might lead one to inappropriately predict that all persons with zero earnings  would get 
high benefits, when in reality, only those with disabilities would. Such a disability program 
docs exist in the United States. However, we control for disability status in our model. And 
there is a bias in the other direction. Some people with zero earnings actually do not qualify 
for aid, either because they do not meet asset tests or because their zero earnings represent 
measurement error in the data. These persons would get zero benefits, which would tend to 
pull the projected benefits for zero earners downward. The Determinants of Changing Poverty and Whether Work Will Work  347 
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Fig. 8.15  Benefits for singles with children in Britain, by weekly earnings category 
Fig. 8.16 
(nondisahled, nonwidowed),  by annual earnings category 
Benefits for single-adult-headed households in the United States 
of reductions in food stamp and other benefits, for there have not been any 
statutory cuts at the national level. In any case, by  1999, the difference in 
benefits for someone with  zero earnings  and  someone earning up  to 
$1 5,000 were small. 
Of particular relevance to the factors influencing poverty, the benefits 
for zero earnings are now considerably lower than in Britain, even though 348  Richard Dickens and David T.  Ellwood 
wages are often much higher in the United States. In purchasing power 
weekly equivalents, the U.S. benefit for a zero earner is only &65  per week.I9 
Even the benefits of the 1980s were only the equivalent of &loo.  Thus, 
The benefit structures for single parents and the trends over time look 
dramatically different in the United States and Britain. In the United 
States, benefits received by zero-earning single parents have fallen dra- 
matically in recent years and benefits to those with low to moderate in- 
comes have risen sharply. By contrast, in Britain, benefits (largely due 
to rises in housing aid) have risen sharply for zero-earning single par- 
ents and incentives for work have, if anything, worsened. 
The average benefit for a zero-earning single parent as a fraction of the 
current relative poverty standard for a family of three in Britain was 62 
percent in 1999 and 92 percent as a fraction of the absolute standard. 
In the United States, this observed benefit for a zero-earning single 
parents is now just 19 percent of the relative poverty line and only 36 
percent  of the U.S. absolute poverty  line. With British  benefits far 
closer to the poverty lines, especially for absolute poverty, it should 
come as no surprise that benefit  expansions had a relatively  large 
impact  on single-parent  poverty,  particularly  absolute  poverty,  in 
Britain, while benefit changes had much smaller impacts on poverty 
rates in the United States. 
Given the sharp difference in the trends in benefits and incentives be- 
tween the two nations, it is at least plausible that benefit structures are in- 
fluencing the divergent patterns of work, and we consider that issue in the 
next section. 
But before looking at the question of behavioral impacts, we examine be- 
nefit patterns for other groups. Figures 8.17 and 8.18 show benefits for 
couples with children in Great Britain and the United States. The British 
patterns show a rise in benefits for those with zero and low earnings in the 
early 198Os, then a flattening in the mid-l980s, perhaps because the index- 
ing system was changed. Whereas previously  benefit  increases were in- 
dexed to wage increases or price rises they were now tied only to price in- 
creases-and  thus just kept pace with inflation. In the late 1980s a variety 
of housing-benefit  changes were implemented that reduced such aid. In 
particular, a capital limit of &6,000 was introduced before an individual 
could qualify (see Evans (1996) for an excellent review). These probably ac- 
19. The sharp decline in the number of persons with zero earnings in the United States 
probably causes this figure to be exaggeratedly low. Some of the zero earners are probably data 
errors, or people with sizable assets who qualify for no  aid. In the extreme case where one ig- 
nores all those getting zero benefits, the average benefit for a zero earner is $7,200, down from 
$9,000 in the 1980s, still vastly lower than the British benefit. Moreover, one would generally 
expect a strong potential bias in the other direction among those getting aid. Persons who 
could get the highest benefits should be more likely to have zero earnings. The Determinants of Changing Poverty and Whether Work Will Work  349 
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count for the benefit falls of the mid- to late 1980s. Finally, in 1986 the So- 
cial Security Act introduced wide-ranging reforms to the benefit system. 
The aim was to simplify the benefit system and to provide greater rewards 
to work. Supplementary Benefit was replaced by the simpler Income Sup- 
port, which varied just by age and family structure. Family Credit replaced 350  Richard Dickens and David T. Ellwood 
Family  Income  Supplement  in providing  a supplement  for low-income 
working families with children and was more generous than its predeces- 
sor. During this period  benefits begin  to rise again-about  half due to 
housing-aid expansion as rents rose and capital limits were increased. 
in the United States, benefits for couples are far lower and show far less 
change over time, though the changes vaguely mimic the patterns for single 
parents in that less and less aid is available for those with zero earnings and 
more is being offered for those with low to moderate earnings. Still, the 
striking feature of this figure is just how much lower benefits are for couples 
in the United States. One seeming peculiarity in the U.S. data can be read- 
ily explained. In years of recession the average benefits received by zero- 
and low-earning couples tends to jump up. That is because  a group of 
former workers becomes  unemployed  and then qualifies for short-term 
(twenty-six to thirty-eight weeks) unemployment benefits. 
Benefits for couples differ considerably between the United States and 
Britain as well. British aid for low- and zero-earning families is con- 
siderably more generous and has become more so over time. in the 
United States, even couples with zero earnings average just $4,000- 
5,000 in aid, or the purchasing power equivalent of E50-65  per week. 
in Britain, couples with zero earnings now average El60 per week. It 
seems no wonder that in Britain, expanding aid has had a far larger 
role in reducing poverty. 
The patterns of U.S./British differences persist when we examine aid for 
In Britain, benefits for single adults with zero earnings have also risen 
significantly over time. And in the United States, aid to nondisabled 
single adults is almost nonexistent. 
We now turn to the most difficult question: What, if  any, effects have 
single adults (not shown): 
these benefit structures had on behavior? 
8.7.1  Behavioral Effects of Aid 
There are several strategies that are commonly followed to determine the 
impact of benefits and benefit changes on work. The first is to attempt to 
calculate the actual level of benefits for which each family could qualify us- 
ing measures of benefit levels, eligibility rules, effective tax rates, and the 
like and to treat these parameters as exogenous. One would then use these 
in a structural model of labor-supply behavior. There is a long history of 
such modeling in work in both Britain and United States.z0 
The difficulty of such methods when examining overall poverty patterns 
20. See, for example, Bingley and Walker (l997), Blundell, Duncan,  and Meghir (2000), At- 
tanasio and MaCurdy (1997), and Moffitt (1986). The Determinants of Changing Poverty and Whether Work Will Work  351 
is that the wide range of often interacting benefits is difficult to model. 
Moreover, elements such as stigma, administrative complexity, and hostility/ 
supportiveness of providers that sharply influence take-up rates severely 
complicate structural models. In the United States the recent changes have 
proven particularly hard to model (Ellwood 2000). 
A second strategy is to include a variety of measures of the structure of 
benefits, such as maximum benefit amounts, tax rates, indicators of sanc- 
tion regimes or time limits, and the scope of the EITC in a reduced-form 
labor-supply equation along with wages. Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999), 
Eissa and Hoynes (1999), and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) all offer good 
recent examples in the United States. 
A final strategy is to compare behavior, over time, of groups of people 
whose incentives have been differentially affected by altered policy. Typi- 
cally this work uses difference-in-difference techniques to look for evidence 
that the policy had an impact. This strategy or variations on it have been 
used by Eissa and Liebman (1996) and many others. One variation on this 
technique, used by Ellwood (2000), is to examine the changed incentives 
and track the work behavior of people at different parts of a predicted wage 
distribution. Often, policies affect only low-potential earners, and thus 
differential work behavior can be tied to changes in policy. 
Our imprecise methods for estimating benefits and the enormous differ- 
ences across countries largely preclude our use of the first two strategies. 
But we can at least use the models to gain a rough sense of how work in- 
centives have changed over time in each country for people in different 
family settings who have differing potential wages, and to compare these to 
changes in work. 
This methodology is discussed in detail in Ellwood (2000), so we  will 
only briefly describe it here. We begin by predicting wages-this  time with- 
out residuals-for  everyone in our sample according to the  1979 wage 
model. We then use these predicted wages to break people into thirds in 
each year, separately for men and women. Thus, regardless of whether 
people worked, we have a predicted wage third. We can then track incen- 
tives and work for people in those thirds. Wage thirds make more sense 
than, say, educational levels, because the fraction with a given educational 
level changes considerably over time. We use the 1979 model for creating 
the wage thirds in each year to ensure that we really are tracking a compa- 
rable group over time, not following different people as returns to educa- 
tion and other variables shift. 
Simple economic theory suggests that two factors ought to influence 
work decisions: first, the level of income/benefits the person would get in 
the absence of work (a pure income effect), and then the gain they would 
get by working (a substitution effect). We have already observed what hap- 
pens to the benefits of persons and families with zero earnings: They rose 
over time in Britain for all family types, and benefits were considerably 352  Richard Dickens and David T. Ellwood 
higher than in the United States. In the United  States, benefits for non- 
workers fell over time, particularly for single parents. Thus, based on the 
income effect alone, one would expect work to fall in Britain and rise in the 
United States. But the substitution effect-the  gain to working-also  mat- 
ters. Wages have risen in Britain (although less so in entry  jobs) and benefit 
structures changed. It is possible that the gains to working have increased 
considerably as wages have gone up. 
We used our model to get a rough sense of how the gains to work may 
have changed  over  time  and across countries.  For each person  in  the 
sample, we first predicted that person’s potential wage if he or she worked 
using the wage equation of their sample year. Once again, we do not proj- 
ect residuals to avoid some forms of selection bias. We then use our benefits 
models to predict what benefits the household would get if the person did 
not work, and what would be received if the person worked full time at the 
predicted wage.2’  To simplify this analysis, we looked only at work behav- 
ior of  the heads and partners for this work-the  income of others was 
taken as given. For couples, we estimated benefits under a variety of joint 
work assumptions.22 
Finally, we calculated a very simple predicted gain to work from earn- 
ings less benefit changes. We did so by adding the gain in earnings to the 
predicted benefits given this level of earnings and then subtracting the be- 
nefits the individual would have gotten had he or she not worked. This gain 
to work is decidedly not a full measure of the returns to working. We take 
no account of childcare costs, work expenses, or income or payroll taxes in 
the two countries. But we do at least have a sense of how the gains from 
work due to earnings plus benefit offsets have changed over time. 
Single Parents 
We again start by looking at single parents. We have already seen that be- 
nefits for those with zero earnings  rose quite significantly over time in 
Britain and fell precipitously in the United States. What happened to the 
gains to work from earnings less benefit changes? Figures 8.19 and 8.20 
show the results for Britain and the United States by predicted wage third. 
Once again we see large differences: 
21. Note that the predicted wage used to determine benefits is based on the equation for that 
year. The predicted wage used to classify people into potential wage thirds is based on the 
1979  model. 
22. Note that this methodology could overpredict the potential wage for those who do  not 
actually work, since those not working are more likely to have a negative wage residual. 
Gregg, Johnson, and Reed 1999 use “entry wages” for different groups of workers to model 
the expected wage. But since we  arc looking at potential gains to work for workers at differ- 
ent levels of education and age, the entry-level wage is not appropriate for use here. Addi- 
tionally, entry jobs have increasingly become part time, and many of these would not be 
entry-level workers if they worked. €450 
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Fig. 8.19  Predicted gain in earnings less benefit changes for full-time work single 
parents in Britain, by predicted wage class 
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Fig. 8.20  Predicted gain in earnings less benefit changes for full-time work: single 
parents in the United States, by predicted wage class 
Note: Predicted wage class: terciles of all men or of all women based on predicted wages (1979 
models) in each year. 354  Richard Dickens and David T.  Ellwood 
For British single mothers, the predicted gain in earnings less benefit 
changes from entering work has risen over time somewhat, primarily 
because of rising wages. But the gain from work for women in the bot- 
tom third of predicted wages has risen from just E57 to E89 per week. 
And this ignores the costs of childcare, work expenses, and taxes. Even 
for single mothers in the top third, the gains from work average 5200 
per week-or  the U.S. equivalent of less than $16,000 per year. 
For single mothers in the United States, the gains in earnings less be- 
nefit changes from working are significantly higher and they have risen 
dramatically. In percentage terms, gains were particularly  great for 
single mothers in the lowest third, although in absolute terms they 
were greater for women in the top third. The gain (from earnings and 
benefits alone) for single mothers in the bottom third rose roughly 
$4,500 since 1993 (British equivalent of E60 per week). Single mothers 
in the top third stand to gain nearly $30,000. 
Again, we emphasize that these gains are not the whole story. But adding 
other elements would, if anything, make things more dramatic. In the 
United States, Ellwood (2000) calculates that the returns to working, after 
taking out childcare costs and taxes and adding in other benefits such as 
aid for childcare, have risen from under $2,000 to over $7,000. The change 
in returns is quite close to what is predicted here, but the starting levels are 
lower due to accounting for other expenses. 
Combining the effects of vastly higher benefits when not working and 
continuing low returns to work, one would presumably expect work to de- 
cline among single mothers in Britain, especially at the bottom. In the 
United States one would expect to see the reverse. Figures 8.21 and 8.22 
show that the predictions are borne out, though not perfectly. 
consistent with changed work incentives, single parents in Britain are 
working less and those in the United States working more. Consistent 
with  theory,  gains in  work  are particularly  great among low-wage 
single parents in the United States. One puzzle, however, is that in 
Britain, work declines were about as large for people in all three wage 
thirds. One would generally expect social policies to have their great- 
est impact for those with the least earning potential. 
Couples 
The work incentives for couples are a bit more complicated because 
there are four different combinations of work and nonwork for the part- 
ners-more  if one allows for part-time work. Rather than focus on all of 
these, we shall present only two: the gains in earnings plus benefit changes 
if the man goes to work full time and the woman is not working, and the 
gains from work if the woman works full time when the husband is already 
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Fig. 8.21 
wage third (three-year centered moving averages) 
Note: Predicted wage third: terciles of all women based on predicted wages (1979 models) in 
each year. 
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Fig. 8.22  Percentage working among singles with children in the United States, by 
predicted wage third 
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but this gives the rough incentives for families considering sending one or 
two people into the labor market. 
Figures 8.23 and 8.24 show the gains to sending the man into full-time 
work in an otherwise workless household in Britain and the United States. 
Once again we find striking differences. As always, scales are roughly equil- 
ibrated to purchasing power equity. 
There are very large differences by country in the gains to working for 
a man if he is to be the only worker in a joint household. In the United 
States, even someone in the bottom wage third can expect to see gains 
in earnings and benefits of close to $17,000 per year (221  7 per week), 
and this has risen somewhat in recent years. In Britain the gain is just 
&82  per week, and this amount has fallen sharply since the early 1990s. 
Even those in the middle third stand to gain just El30 (U.S. $10,200) 
from a full-time job. In the United States, with lower benefits and 
higher  median wages, workers in the middle  stand to gain  nearly 
$25,000 in earnings less any benefit changes. 
Given the rising aid for those not working and low and declining returns 
for those in the bottom third, one would anticipate declines in work by men 
in Britain and, if anything, increases in work in the United States. Figures 
8.25 and 8.26 show the actual patterns. 
Work by  men in  couples is clearly cyclical; consistent with altered 
incentives, however, work  declined  overall among men  in  Britain, $45,000  I 
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Fig. 8.25  Percentage working among males in couples with children in Britain, by 
predicted wage third (three-year centered moving averages) 
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Fig. 8.26  Percentage working among husbands with children in the United States, 
by predicted wage third 
Note: Predictcd wage third: terciles of all men bascd on the 1979 wage equation. 
particularly among men in the lowest third. And work among hus- 
bands with children rose in the United States.23  Still, we again see the 
result that declines in work were sizable even among those in the high- 
est wage categories in Britain. 
One puzzle in the British data is why work by female partners is rising 
rapidly while work by male partners is declining. Figures 8.27 and 8.28 give 
some hint as to why that might be occurring. If most of the women enter- 
ing the labor market are in homes where the man is already working, these 
are families already getting relatively low benefits, so the decision to work 
is primarily a question of what can be earned net of child care and work ex- 
penses. 
In Britain, the gains from sending a second worker into the labor mar- 
ket are much higher than for sending the first worker. Whereas a man 
in the bottom tercile who is the first earner in a household gained just 
&82, a woman who is the second earner in such settings would gain 
over El50 per week even though her gross pay is lower. In the United 
States, a comparable woman in the bottom third would gain perhaps 
23. The rise in work in the United States is all the more remarkable since disability programs 
expanded and work by men overall did diminish somewhat. €450 
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Fig. 8.28  Predicted gain in earnings less benefit changes for full-time work: wives 
with children in the United States, by predicted wage class (assuming husband al- 
ready works full time) 
Note: Predicted wage third: terciles of all women based on the 1979 wage equation. 360  Richard Dickens and David T.  Ellwood 
$14,000 (E180). Women in higher wage thirds gain considerably more 
and the gains have been growing over time. 
Actually,  this example  does illustrate  some limits to our admittedly 
rather imprecise methodology. Others have shown that returns to work for 
women  at the bottom have fallen somewhat  in recent  years due to the 
EITC, whereas this analysis shows things to be unchanged. 
Figures 8.29 and 8.30 indicate work patterns of women in couples. 
Consistent with observed incentives, women in couples are working 
more in both nations. In Britain the rise is particularly notable among 
women at the bottom-in  contrast to the increasing worklessness for 
all other groups. By contrast, work by U.S. wives in the bottom third 
leveled off  in the late 1980s and early  1990s, unlike the pattern for 
wives in higher wage categories. Both of these patterns are roughly 
consistent with observed changes in incentives. 
Of  course, there are many other reasons that women may be working 
more, including changing attitudes and expectations. Still, what is striking 
is that trends among women in couples in Britain and the United States are 
broadly similar, but differ in specifics in ways consistent with incentives. In 
Britain, the lowest-wage women increased work the most. In the United 
States, they increased it the least. And in both cases, their behavior defies 
the patterns of all other low-wage groups in the country. In Britain, where 
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Fig. 8.29  Percentage working among women in couples with children in Britain, by 
predicted wage third (three-year centered moving averages) 
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Fig. 8.30  Percentage working among wives with children in the United States, by 
predicted wage third 
Nore: Predicted wage third: terciles of all women based on the 1979 wage equation. 
more. In the United States, where others are working more, low-skill wives 
have not increased their work. The results reinforce findings from Gregg, 
Hansen, and Wadsworth (1999), which suggest that the increasing polar- 
ization of work within couples in Britain may be related to features of the 
social benefit system that create weak work incentives among  families with 
no workers, and relatively strong incentives for a second earner when one 
person is already working. 
Singles without Children 
tions (not shown). 
Finally, we examined work incentives and work behavior in the two na- 
In general, the returns to working seem to have changed little for single 
adults in the two nations. But the sharp rise in benefits for those with 
no earnings (the income effect) in Britain coupled with no change in 
the gains to working would be expected to reduce work by singles in 
the bottom third. That is precisely the pattern on finds in the British 
data. 
Conclusions Regarding Behavioral Results 
Our examination of the broad trends in work incentives suggest that they 
may explain an important part of the divergent trends in the United States 
and Britain. 362  Richard Dickens and David T. Ellwood 
In general, incentives to work were always stronger in the United 
States and particularly for single parents they have recently become 
much stronger. By contrast, incentives for work in Britain have gener- 
ally weakened  over time-benefits  for nonworkers have risen,  and 
gains to work have fallen in some cases and been stable in others. 
There is one exception: gains to work by second earners have increased 
somewhat. And wives are the only group working more in Britain. 
Still, declining work even among the highest potential wage group 
suggests that more than just work incentives is operating here. 
8.8  Reducing Poverty: Potential and Limits of Work-Based Strategies 
Prime Minister Tony Blair’s government committed itself to reducing 
child poverty by  half over the next ten years and to its abolition within 
twenty years. A central element of this effort has included a series of pol- 
icy initiatives designed to encourage work and to “make work pay.” The 
main changes in Britain are the introduction of the Working Families Tax 
Credit (WFTC), which provides generous support for low-income working 
families and includes a (potentially very generous) childcare element; the 
National Minimum Wage; reform of the National Insurance system; the 
introduction of a 10 percent starting rate of income tax; and the National 
Childcare Strategy. These policies have been combined with various New 
Deal policies, most of which impose participation in work or training as a 
condition of benefit receipt. Furthermore, benefits to all families with chil- 
dren, regardless of work status, have become more generous with real in- 
creases in child benefit and income support and the introduction of the 
Child Tax Credit. 
Table 8.2 helps to illustrate the larger themes of this paper, and points to 
the potential and the limits of work-based policies as a central element in 
reducing child poverty. The table shows the distribution of poor children 
by total work hours of everyone in the household. The first column shows 
that currently over half of poor children are in homes where no one  is work- 
ing, and only a third are in homes where people are working thirty hours 
or more. 
Unless demographic, economic, or policy change induces more par- 
ents of children to work, the only way to reduce poverty by 50 percent 
would be to reduce poverty among nonworking families. Absent be- 
havioral change, added support for working families will still leave the 
majority of poor children poor. 
The table also shows what would happen to child poverty if one could 
magically return to the work levels of 1979, but retain the wage and demo- 
graphic patterns of 1999. The percentage of children in poverty in the cur- 
rent setting and under this scenario can be seen in the second and fourth The Determinants of Changing Poverty and Whether Work Will Work  363 
Table 8.2  Distribution of Poor Children by Work Hours of Family: Actual 1999 and Projected 
If Work Patterns Were Comparable to 1979 
Actual Patterns in 1999 
Children Who Are 
Poor and Living 
Total Hours  YO  Distribution  in Families with 
Worked by All  of Poor Children  Given Work Hours 
Persons in the  by Work Hours  (as percentage of 
Household  of the Family  all children) 
Projections If Work Patterns in 1999 
Had Been Comparable to Those of 1979 
Children Who Are 
Poor and Living 
'YO  Distribution  in Families with 
of Poor Children  Given Work Hours 
by Work Hours  (as percentage of 
of the Family  all children) 
No work hours  51.1  17.6  31.7  11.0 
1-29  hours  16.1  5.5  12.4  3.6 
30 hours and over  32.8  11.3  49.9  14.5 
All work levels  100.0  34.5  100.0  29.1 
columns. The overall poverty rate would fall from 34.5 percent to 29.1 per- 
cent. Impressively, the share of all children who are poor and in homes 
where no one is working would fall from 17.6 percent to 11  .O percent. But 
overall poverty would not fall as much because the number of children in 
working poor families would rise. One can see that the percentage of all 
children who are poor and living in families with more than thirty work 
hours would rise from 11.3 percent to 14.5  percent. 
Work changes alone are unlikely to dramatically reduce poverty of 
children. Even if work levels could be restored to those of 1979, con- 
tinuing low pay would leave many children poor. Many families would 
move from being the workless poor to the working poor. Poverty 
would fall by only 5 percentage points (out of 35 percent).24 
But if many more people were induced to work and work were made to 
pay, the goal of reducing child poverty by half might be achieved. In the 
fourth column of table 8.2, one can infer that if work were at the 1979 lev- 
els and if those who would otherwise be poor in families with thirty or more 
hours of work were removed from poverty, only 14.6  percent of all children 
would remain poor (the  11  .O percent in families that would still not be 
working and the 3.6 percent in families with 1-29  work hours). 
If work could be increased back to the 1979 levels, and if work were 
made to pay sufficiently so that no family with thirty hours of work 
was left poor, then poverty among children could fall from its current 
level of roughly 35 percent to approximately 15 percent, achieving the 
24. Other evidence in support of this conclusion comes from the U.S. experience where ris- 
ing work had very small effects on relative poverty. It did have large effects on absolute 
poverty, because the absolute poverty standard is so much lower in the United States. 364  Richard Dickens and David T. Ellwood 
goal of a 50 percent reduction in poverty. If the make-work-pay poli- 
cies reduced poverty among those who were working part time as well, 
poverty could fall still further. 
Thus, at least theoretically, a work-based strategy could significantly re- 
duce poverty among children. Still, this table assumed that work levels that 
prevailed in the late 1970s could somehow be restored and that work really 
could be made to pay enough to keep families out of poverty. Is that level 
of change really feasible? 
Clearly  the United  States has  successfully raised  work  among low- 
income families, notably single parents. But the differences in the U.S. and 
British benefit systems are enormous. Single parents in Britain with zero 
earnings get benefits equivalent to just 62 percent of the relative poverty 
standard. The United States pays just 19 percent! Two-parent families and 
single adults without children get even less. To mimic the financial work in- 
centives in the United States, benefits for nonworking families would have 
to be cut enormously for all families while maintaining aid for working 
ones. And, of course, cuts in benefits for nonworkers will  surely raise 
poverty or increase hardship among those with little or no earnings. 
Alternatively, aid for working families could be expanded dramatically, 
while maintaining support for nonworking families. This would also help 
in ensuring that working families avoid poverty. Dilnot and McCrae (1999) 
show that WFTC is well targeted as a redistributive tool, with most gains 
going to households in the 2nd decile of the income distribution. Unfortu- 
nately, increases in in-work benefits of the sort enacted to date with the 
WFTC seem unlikely to change work incentives to the extent seen in the 
United States, especially if the change in policy is largely offset by housing 
benefit changes, as Blundell and Hoynes (chap. 10 in this volume) seem to 
suggest. The gap in income for workers and nonworkers is simply too lim- 
ited, and the recent increases in benefits to all families with children may 
induce adverse income effects on labor supply. If the WFTC were greatly 
expanded, costs could rise sharply or benefits would need to be phased out 
so rapidly for working families above the poverty line that this would cre- 
ate another set of adverse incentives. Still, that may be a promising domain 
for further reforms. 
The U.S.  example may again be instructive. The United States spends 
more now on in-work benefits than it ever did on cash-based benefits for 
the nonworking poor. The gain from going to work has increased consid- 
erably. Benefits paid are large enough to pull families with four or fewer 
members and a full-time minimum-wage worker over the U.S.  absolute 
poverty line of $17,356. But benefits are nowhere near enough to push 
people above a relative poverty line that exceeds $30,000. In table 8.1 we 
saw that increased work led to reduced absolute poverty but little change 
in relative poverty. Some observers believe it will be difficult fiscally and po- The Determinants of Changing Poverty and Whether Work Will Work  365 
litically to increase in-work benefits a great deal more in the United States, 
and economists are increasingly worried about the adverse incentives cre- 
ated as benefits phase out when people move toward the middle class. 
Of course, if the underlying pattern of wages could be made more equal, 
work might increase and poverty would fall. Altering the underlying dis- 
tribution of wages would require rapid and effective intervention to narrow 
differences in  skills and opportunity-and  even  that may  not narrow 
wages too much (see Devroye and Freeman 2000). 
One might hope that moving people into the labor market would lead to 
rising experience and, with that, higher wages and ultimately less relative 
poverty. Keeping people working steadily rather than episodically  might nar- 
row the wage distribution somewhat. But recent work by Burtless (forth- 
coming), Gottschalk (2000), and others suggests that wages rise even less 
with experience for low-skill workers than for others. Dickens’s (2000) 
work on mobility and Stewart’s (1999) on the low pay-no  pay cycle offer a 
similar caution. Indeed, individuals are likely to require some form of in- 
work support or training that enables them to progress into better jobs. 
The final strategy would be to find some way  to reverse some of the 
demographic changes, particularly in family structure. Here the United 
States has virtually no lessons to offer. There are few clear policy strategies 
that successfully reduce the incidence of single-parent families-although 
there are some signs that recent increases in work among single parents in 
Britain may be partly due to a changing composition of this group. 
Difficult as it might be to halve poverty through work-based strategies, 
it will be even harder to move toward complete elimination. Under almost 
any plausible scenario, a great many workless households will still remain, 
so even dramatic expansions of in-work benefits will probably not pull 
down  poverty  rates  enough to meet  the government’s goal of  halving 
poverty. One could also seek to raise benefits for all low-income families 
with children with larger child credits and similar schemes. Piachaud and 
Sutherland (2000) argue that measures of this type introduced by the Blair 
government are likely to have a significant impact on nonworking poor 
families. The difficulty with this strategy is that one is likely to dampen 
down the increased work incentives, Such a policy of increasing support to 
nonworking families while creating strong incentives may prove to be very 
costly, since it inevitably runs into the basic dilemma of  reform-a  high 
guarantee and strong work incentives imply a very high break-even point, 
so that benefits are collected by a very large portion of the population. 
There are other ways to increase work beyond the use of financial incen- 
tives. In the United States and to a lesser degree in the United Kingdom, 
there is a move toward requiring work (in government subsidized jobs if 
necessary) as a condition of aid for some persons while providing more 
generous aid to those not expected to work, in an attempt to deal with this 
dilemma. But such policies raise difficult, value-laden issues of determin- 366  Richard Dickens and David T. Ellwood 
ing who is expected to work and determining penalties when they do not 
do so. We suspect that the changed attitudes and expectations of welfare 
workers and the public at large has had every bit as much to do with the rise 
in work among single parents as financial incentives have in the United 
States. British policymakers may need to pursue both sharp improvements 
in incentives and various administrative policies if they are really deter- 
mined to increase work and reduce poverty. 
This discussion should not be seen as pessimistic about the potential for 
work-based strategies to reduce poverty. But only a combination of strate- 
gies that dramatically increase work and increase the pay of low-wage par- 
ents seems likely to change things dramatically. And absent ways to narrow 
wage differentials or change family structures, sharply reducing poverty 
will prove a formidable and expensive challenge. 
8.9  Concluding Thoughts 
This paper has provided  a strategy for decomposing the factors in- 
fluencing poverty in Britain and the United States. Striking similarities and 
differences are at work in the two nations. Demographic and wage change 
is a dominant force in both nations. Work is falling among many low-wage 
groups in Britain but rising on the other side of the Atlantic. Social poli- 
cies have increased incomes but may have reduced work in Britain, and 
they may have done the opposite in the United States. 
The paper also suggests the potential for detailed cross-national exami- 
nations. The notion that the economic incentives built into policy are influ- 
encing outcomes within a nation are reinforccd in this paper by  the fact 
that when incentives differ in the two countries, so too do work patterns. 
And one can see far more clearly than most casual observers realize that 
social policies are often profoundly different. Ultimately, the hard work of 
policy analysis will probably remain a within-borders affair. But under- 
standing the larger forces shaping poverty in several nations helps to illus- 
trate both the potential and the limits of policies to reduce it. 
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